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Abstract
In research on cultural taste and distinction, inconsistent and ambivalent attitudes 
towards hierarchy versus equality have largely been ignored. This study shows, by 
means of in-depth interviews with 90 Dutch people on their own and others’ cultural 
tastes, that both a hierarchical and an egalitarian repertoire appear in people’s 
narratives, and that these repertoires are often used simultaneously. People still 
distinguish culturally from others, but not consistently and often reluctantly, as they 
morally object to high–low distinctions based on aesthetic evaluations at the same 
time. This article analyses both repertoires and explores when and how tensions 
between the two come forward. We interpret these tensions on the micro level 
of self-presentation and habitus, and on the macro level of changing structures of 
inequality and meritocratic ideas.
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Introduction
Modern Western societies are characterised by a tension between normative egalitarian-
ism and actual social inequality, as De Tocqueville (1990 (1835)) and other social theo-
rists observed in the 19th century. In recent times, this tension may even have grown. 
Whereas socio-economic inequality tends to rise (see, for example, Piketty, 2014), moral 
norms that stress basic human equality – equal rights, non-discrimination, equality of 
opportunity – are perhaps stronger and more widespread than ever before. This is not 
only an intellectual issue; people have to cope with such contradictions in everyday life. 
How do they negotiate between their practices of social distinction and their morally-
grounded egalitarian ideas?
In dealing with this question, this article focuses on tensions in the practices and per-
ceptions of cultural hierarchy. As Bourdieu (1984) argued extensively, cultural taste 
preferences are more than just aesthetic – they indicate and express social distinctions, 
which affirm and reinforce class differences. Yet, the question is how strong the connec-
tions between class position, aesthetic judgements and status distinction are, and how 
they may change over time. The thesis of omnivorousness, developed in a critical 
response to Bourdieu’s theory, and supported by numerous empirical findings, contends 
that exclusive, highly distinctive, ‘snobbish’ preferences for high culture among high-
status groups increasingly have given way to an ‘omnivorous’ taste that combines prefer-
ences for high and popular culture, indicating trends of increasing openness and tolerance, 
weakening distinction, blurring class boundaries and declining social and cultural hierar-
chies (e.g. Ollivier, 2008; Peterson, 2005; Peterson and Kern, 1996).
Other scholars have shown, however, that ‘omnivorousness’ and cultural distinction 
can easily go together. They point out, for example, that well-educated cultural omni-
vores distinguish themselves precisely by their breadth of cultural knowledge and inter-
est (Prieur and Savage, 2013; Van Eijck, 2000); that these omnivores often are highly 
selective and exclusive in their specific preferences (Bennett et al., 2009; Bryson, 1996; 
Warde et al., 2007); that they differ from less-educated ‘univores’ in their attitudes 
towards popular cultural products (Holt, 1998; Jarness, 2015; Peters et al., 2018; cf. 
Lizardo, 2008); or that distinctive practices develop within genres that are convention-
ally defined as popular (Bachmayer et al., 2014; Friedman and Kuipers, 2013; Thornton, 
1995). This suggests at least a partial reconfirmation of Bourdieu’s original thesis, and a 
continuation of cultural hierarchical practices, rather than a decline.
As we will argue in this article, unambiguous answers to the central questions in this 
on-going debate cannot simply be given, since the ‘reality’ that these answers should 
uncover is itself ambiguous. The cultural hierarchies that are the focus of study are not 
rock solid social facts, but rest on social definitions marred by controversy, doubts and 
ambivalence. More specifically, as will be pointed out, social distinctions connected with 
aesthetic judgements are often contradicted or downplayed on moral grounds (cf. 
Lamont, 1992).
This study deals with what is usually left out in the studies of cultural taste and dis-
tinction. Based on in-depth interviews with 90 respondents living in the Netherlands with 
various educational and social backgrounds, it explores how people define cultural hier-
archies; how they position their own and others’ taste preferences in relation to perceived 
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hierarchies; and whether, how and why they affirm or reject high–low distinctions. The 
interviews brought to light two types of conflicting repertoires: a hierarchical and an 
egalitarian one. Some respondents took only one of the stances, but most expressed both 
views, indicating inconsistency, ambivalence and tensions. While some students of cul-
tural taste and distinction paid attention to such ambiguities (Jarness and Friedman, 
2017), these have hardly been a topic of systematic research.
After a short account of some theoretical ideas on contradictions and some methodo-
logical considerations, we present the analysis of our findings. We first describe how 
people use the hierarchical and the egalitarian repertoire in defining their own and others’ 
cultural preferences. This is followed by an analysis of when and how individuals com-
bine these repertoires. Finally, we interpret our findings on different levels: a micro level 
of both deliberate self-presentation and internalised habitus, and a macro level that 
explores the historical roots of the hierarchical and the egalitarian repertoire and the 
potentially ambiguous consequences of present-day meritocratic ideology.
Dealing with ambivalence and contradictions in cultural 
sociology
In general, sociologists have difficulties in recognising ambivalences and inconsistencies 
in the ways people express their ideas, opinions and feelings. This is most apparent in 
quantitative research, in which respondents fill in questionnaires with given answer 
alternatives. However, it also applies to much qualitative interview research, including 
research on cultural preferences and practices. Cultural omnivorousness is often put in 
perspective by developing a new typology with sharp demarcations between clusters of 
respondents. For instance, Holt (1998) describes two contrasting taste and consumption 
practices, Ollivier (2008) identifies four ideal types of ‘openness’, Atkinson (2011) com-
pares the musical tastes and practices of the ‘dominant’ and the ‘dominated’ and Jarness 
(2015) distinguishes four ‘modes of consumption’; all without any apparent inconsisten-
cies or ambivalences in respondents’ attitudes and orientations. It could be that inconsist-
encies and ambivalences simply did not show up in the interviews.1 However, it is likely 
that such elements in respondents’ narratives were overlooked or ignored, because they 
did not accord with the researchers’ wish to present unambiguous results.
Not all studies neglect ambivalences and inconsistencies in people’s narratives, how-
ever. Discourse analysts studied ‘variability’ in language (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), 
more specifically the contradictory repertoires out of which people construct a narrative 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1988). Within sociology, the most prominent example is Ann 
Swidler’s (1986, 2001) work on switching between ‘cultural repertoires’. She demon-
strated that people are often inconsistent in their conversations. They ‘make use of varied 
cultural resources, many of which they do not fully embrace’ (Swidler, 2001: 19). Culture 
in this approach is a ‘toolkit’ containing ‘diverse cultural materials’, from which people 
select some and neglect others, depending on the situational and symbolic context. In 
other words, they may switch between different cultural repertoires available to them. 
Holstein and Gubrium (1995) show that such contradictions can be explored excellently 
by means of in-depth interview research.
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Furthermore, some studies on the more particular issue of present-day class relations 
have pointed out that definitions, perceptions and experiences of class are often ambiva-
lent. For many people, the notion of class is embarrassing, since it is conceived as a 
normative category associated with inequality in human worth, which gives reasons to 
deny the reality of class. At the same time, class inequalities are sensed, felt and recog-
nised in various ways, even if the term class is not used (Savage et al., 2001; Sayer, 2002, 
2005; Van Eijk, 2013).
Recently, Jarness and Friedman (2017) have described contradictions in judgements 
on cultural taste and lifestyle among upper-class people in Norway and the United 
Kingdom, which are, in several respects, quite similar to our own research findings.2 
However, they interpreted these tensions differently. In the conclusion, we will explain 
in what ways our interpretation differs from theirs.
Data and methods
In 2009 and 2010, the first author conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with 90 
people in the Netherlands (Van den Haak, 2014). Questions were asked about their own 
and others’ taste in five cultural fields: music, film, television fiction, theatre and visual 
arts. Each interview began in an open and flexible way with questions about people’s 
likes and dislikes in the present and the past. Subsequently, opinions were asked about 
taste differences with significant others (parents, siblings, partners, friends), as well as 
with distant others, represented by three occupations in different class positions. The last 
part of the interview focused on people’s perceptions of ‘high culture’, ‘low culture’, 
‘good taste’ and ‘bad taste’. In the analysis by means of Atlas.ti, particular attention was 
paid to ambivalences, for instance, by separately coding downplaying remarks.
Because the study was aimed at comparing groups, a quota sample was designed. The 
quotas consisted of three birth cohorts (before 1945, 1945–1965, 1965–1985) and three 
status groups, based on educational level and parents’ educational level: (1) well-edu-
cated with well-educated parents, (2) well-educated with less-educated parents and (3) 
less-educated with less-educated parents.3 This resulted in 9 quotas of 10 people each, 
with an equal number of men and women in each quota.4 Educational level is operation-
alised as ‘high’ when the respondent has a college degree, that is, at least a bachelor’s or 
equivalent degree at a university or professional school, and as ‘low’ when the respond-
ent has, at most, medium vocational education. In each quota, an equal number of men 
and women were interviewed. The quotas were gradually filled in three stages: (1) a 
random sample from phone directories (N = 47); (2) random samples from purposefully 
selected postal codes that, according to official statistics, contain high numbers from 
certain age groups and/or income levels5 (N = 28); and (3) calling upon the first author’s 
own diverse network to fill the last gaps (N = 15). The average response rate in the first 
two stages was about 25 percent.
Analysis: cultural taste and conflicting repertoires
In the interviews, the respondents expressed two types of conflicting views, or reper-
toires, on cultural taste differences: a hierarchical and an egalitarian repertoire. We start 
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this section with an account of both repertoires separately, before describing when and 
how they are combined.
The hierarchical repertoire
Not every aesthetic judgement can automatically be interpreted as an act of social dis-
tinction (Lamont, 1992; Warde, 2011). The minimum empirical evidence for such an 
interpretation is that the person who gives such an assessment defines it as superior, as 
reflecting a better taste than other people have. More than half of the respondents in this 
study demonstrated this in one way or another.
The most common way for people to express distinction is by connecting their dis-
likes of certain cultural items to the people who do like them. Marsha,6 a 44-year-old 
communication adviser, gives her opinion about Dutch language music:
It doesn’t grip me, I find it gross, and er … yes, common too, often. You quickly associate it 
with the audience that attends these [concerts], at least I do.
Some speak about this audience by referring to its size: ‘the majority’ or ‘the masses’. 
More often, respondents use terms that suggest a lower class, such as ‘the common peo-
ple’ or ‘the man in the street’. Others mention specific occupations, or certain neighbour-
hoods or regions that they associate with a working- or lower-middle-class population.
Other much used distinction markers are educational level and, related to that, intel-
ligence. This is often connected with the alleged complexity of ‘high culture’ and with 
the open attitude one needs in order to appreciate alternative or innovative cultural prod-
ucts. Marleen (aged 67, teacher) states that some people are ‘too simple’ to understand 
the ‘cynical and sarcastic’ character of a certain comedy show. And Louis (aged 53, 
journalist) assumes ‘that in general people with brains, let’s say with an IQ over 110, are 
spontaneously inclined to be curious about cultural expressions’. Apparently, less intel-
ligent people are not.
The hierarchical repertoire also comes to the fore in an opposite way: looking up to 
people with a ‘better’ taste, and hence looking down on one’s own taste. Looking down 
and looking up often occur simultaneously: many respondents position themselves at 
some spot in the cultural hierarchy, above and below others (cf. Ollivier, 2008). The 
well-educated are strongly overrepresented in both types of hierarchical practices. 
Hence, they show more awareness and acceptance of a cultural hierarchy and of their 
own place in this hierarchy than the less-educated do. Some of the less-educated respond-
ents also look down on and/or up to others, but often only slightly, or only once in the 
interview.
The egalitarian repertoire
The egalitarian repertoire can be clearly recognised in many interviews as well. 
Egalitarianism is an, often morally grounded, rejection of hierarchy, which comes to the 
fore in several ways. The first is an explicitly individualist and relativist view. Cultural 
taste is seen as subjective and personal, not to be put into boxes, let alone vertically 
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arranged boxes. ‘Tastes differ’, ‘to each his own’, ‘there’s no disputing about taste’ – 
these are the common expressions that often pop up in the interviews. About one-third of 
all respondents, from all educational levels, make such remarks already in the first, open, 
part of the interview, in reply to questions on the reasons for their likes and dislikes and, 
particularly, on taste differences with significant others.7 Some express very strong dis-
likes about a certain taste, but explicitly add that this should not be interpreted as a social 
distinction. This is shown by Hans (aged 64, steel industry calibrator), when speaking 
about house music: ‘I call it fucking noise, but that’s my opinion, someone else likes it’. 
An interview question on good and bad taste triggers such responses even more fre-
quently: the distinction between good and bad taste is often regarded as ‘individual’, 
‘arbitrary’ or ‘neutral’ (cf. Warde, 2007).
Second, the most explicit anti-hierarchical remarks are made in response to questions 
about the meaning of the concepts ‘high culture’ and ‘low culture’. While several 
respondents answer these questions by giving definitions or examples, about one-third 
– equally distributed over educational levels – respond with outspoken resistance. They 
say, for example, that they do not like these ‘strange’ concepts, that you ‘just cannot use’ 
them or that ‘culture is culture’ without distinctions. The use of the label ‘high culture’ is 
called ‘arrogant’, ‘pretentious’, ‘elitist’ and ‘hot air’; the term ‘low culture’ is character-
ised as ‘disparaging’, ‘discriminating’ and ‘mean’. Strikingly, the most outspoken rejec-
tions are not brought forward by less-educated people, who do not want others to look 
down on them, but by the well-educated, even though many of them personally like items 
that are usually classified as high culture. Apparently, they do not wish others, in particu-
lar less-educated people, to be downgraded by using such concepts.
The third way of expressing an egalitarian view is criticising elite pretensions. 
While such criticisms are expressed by the different educational groups alike, the 
well-educated do so most explicitly. First, members of the economic elite are often 
accused of snobbish status display: they are suspected of visiting events such as clas-
sical concerts with the aim of meeting friends and business relations and of ‘being 
seen’, rather than enjoying the music. Second, members of the cultural elite are criti-
cised for their alleged pretentiousness. They are suspected of not really liking what 
they say they like and of showing off with their self-proclaimed expert opinions and 
sophisticated speech. Third, elite groups in general are accused of claiming superior-
ity and of explicitly looking down on others. For example, Henny (aged 53, civil 
servant) answers the question on the meaning of high culture by stating that artists 
and intellectuals ‘make it high themselves’, so that they can place themselves ‘above 
the rabble and the riff-raff’.
Hence, these anti-hierarchical respondents distinguish themselves from those who do 
distinguish. This distinction with anti-distinction can be interpreted as a moral rather 
than a cultural or aesthetic distinction (cf. Lamont, 1992, 2000). It is often related to a 
moral aversion against social hierarchy in general, conceived in terms of human worth or 
dignity (cf. Sayer, 2002; Van Eijk, 2013). This is particularly articulated by less-educated 
respondents, such as Nel (aged 32, receptionist):
I don’t easily look up to someone anymore. Because: they’re all people, and one person earns 
more money than the other or has more responsibilities than the other, but […] as a human 
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being he just remains a human being. So I think: we’re all the same, they have to sleep too, take 
a shower, eat, change clothes, so that won’t be different. No, I see through that, yes.
It is, above all, the suspected insincerity, the ‘fakeness’, of would-be cultural insiders 
that is condemned, particularly when they are believed to force their opinions upon oth-
ers.8 As a consequence, these anti-hierarchical critics create, paradoxically, a moral hier-
archy instead, in which authenticity and sincerity are core values.
Switching between repertoires
If one assumes – in line with most studies on cultural preferences – that people in general 
are consistent in expressing their views, one would expect them to stick to either a hier-
archical or an egalitarian repertoire when speaking about cultural taste. Although a num-
ber (one-third) of respondents indeed do, there are more who switch between these two 
repertoires. A typology based on a thorough analysis of the interview transcripts reveals 
learns that only 8 out of 90 respondents use the hierarchical repertoire without ever 
switching to the egalitarian one. Conversely, 22 respondents use the egalitarian reper-
toire and ignore the hierarchical one. No fewer than 55 respondents are in some way 
inconsistent or ambivalent.9 There is, in other words, a strong overlap in the use of both 
repertoires. Finally, there are five respondents who do not use either repertoire during the 
interview: they never speak in a hierarchical way, nor do they explicitly oppose this, but 
they only speak about their own and others’ tastes in a neutral way.10 As Table 1 specifies, 
the well-educated are clearly overrepresented in the hierarchical type and the (much 
larger) category of the ambivalent type, whereas the less-educated make up larger pro-
portions of the egalitarian and the neutral categories.
This section presents two different ways in which inconsistencies and ambivalences 
come forward. The first way of switching repertoires is expressing different views in dif-
ferent parts of the interview (cf. Swidler, 2001; Wetherell and Potter, 1988). A good 
example is Koos (aged 60), an upwardly mobile construction engineer, who explicitly 
looks down on the tastes of his less-educated brother, an elevator mechanic. According 
to him, construction workers ‘can only talk about chicks and football, that’s how it 
works’. He also disqualifies the boisterous nouveaux riches in his village (‘not my kind 
of people’), who have a lot of money and drive big cars, but who like the same Dutch-
language singers as his working-class brother. Later, however, he says that ‘you just 
Table 1. Typology of interview narratives, per status group.
Narrative type Well-educated, 
well-educated 
parents
Well-educated, 
less-educated 
parents
Less-educated, 
less-educated 
parents
Total
Only hierarchical 2 5 1 8
Only egalitarian 6 3 13 22
Both: ambivalent 22 20 13 55
Neither: neutral 0 2 3 5
Total 30 30 30 90
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cannot use’ the concept ‘low culture’, because it is based on stereotypes and prejudice. 
For the same reason, he finds high culture ‘a nasty expression’.
Hence, Koos is very distinctive during the more open part of the interview, when he 
can speak about his and others’ likes and dislikes in his own words. However, when he is 
confronted with questions on high and low culture and on good and bad taste in general, 
he realises the inegalitarian and elitist connotations of these terms. There is an apparent 
discrepancy between his valuations of specific taste differences on one hand, and his 
views on general notions of hierarchy and inequality on the other.
The second way in which people show ambivalence – not noted by Swidler (2001) – 
is by downplaying distinctive statements immediately after or even before making them 
(cf. Goffman, 1971: 108–118). Respondents say they do not mean to be ‘negative’, 
‘mean’, ‘insulting’, ‘derogatory’, ‘shitty’, ‘elitist’, ‘arrogant’, ‘snobbish’ or ‘pedantic’, 
directly after having made clear hierarchical distinctions. They mean things ‘with all due 
respect’ and do, after all, not want to ‘judge’ people. They feel uncomfortable about 
either their status display or their explicit looking down on others, and feel the urge to 
correct this image. Some amend their statements in advance, by giving a ‘disclaimer’ to 
convey that what is about to follow should not disrupt the interlocutor’s view of the 
speaker (cf. Hewitt and Stokes, 1975). Helma (aged 71, housewife), for instance, answers 
the interview question on the typical bricklayer’s taste (see below) with:
It sounds very elitist if I say so, but I think the average bricklayer, well, does not have the 
intellectual development to visit a concert hall […] and he doesn’t attend good films and plays, 
no. But of course that’s really generalising, but of course it’s the image that comes up.
Most people do not give a reason why they downplay their statements, but some do. 
First, some say it is hard to find the correct expression that reflects their thoughts. Peter, 
for instance, a 53-year-old trader of supplies, describes low culture as ‘more common’11 
and ‘more coarse’, but he continues:
That’s not a value judgement, by the way. Let that be clear. You have to give it a name, and I 
think that’s the danger of language and giving names, that you sometimes say things with which 
you perhaps express yourself in a derogatory way, but that you don’t mean that way. […] And 
‘common’ doesn’t really sound, er … yes, I wouldn’t know how I could say it differently. If 
there are different terms for it, I’d be glad to hear it!
The second reason given for such downplaying is when one realises that one does not 
really know the people whose taste one looks down on. This reason is often – but not 
only – given in reply to three interview questions on the cultural taste of people in spe-
cific occupations, such as bricklayers, with whom most respondents are not directly 
familiar. After answering, they suddenly realise that they use stereotypes and that reality 
might be different. Louis (aged 53, journalist) meanders between his presumptions about 
the typical bricklayer’s taste and his rejection of these presumptions:
I expect of course that his preference is less sophisticated, yes, I think that he – that counts for 
everyone with more practical and less theoretical schooling – likes [Dutch language singer] 
André Hazes. Of course it sounds insipid and prejudiced, but in eighty percent of the cases it 
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will be that way. But there are also … a bricklayer could just as well be a member of a choir, 
where he started to appreciate Bach. That’s possible, isn’t it? But well, most prejudices are 
correct. Yes.
The third, most frequent, reason for downplaying occurs when people personally know 
other people whose taste they are inclined to look down on. Respondents speak about 
uncomfortable situations in which they keep their opinions to themselves, either because 
they do not want to hurt others’ feelings or because they are afraid that others will find them 
elitist or arrogant. Marsha, who was quoted before with her dislike of Dutch-language 
music and ‘the audience that attends these [concerts]’, knows some childhood friends who 
do like this music. She does not express her dislike to them, because ‘it is their passion, and 
one should respect someone’s dignity’.12 Such tensions occur both in professional contacts 
and in more personal relations, such as with family members. Many respondents who dis-
tinguish themselves from their family’s tastes find an explanation in their own upward 
mobility. They received more education than their parents did and ended up in higher occu-
pations, sometimes also higher than their siblings and childhood friends. Trudy (aged 62, 
nurse), a slightly upwardly mobile woman, expresses her shame about her brother’s and 
sister-in-law’s bad taste, but downplays its significance:
He is a very nice chap, that’s not the point, but we think: good, it’s your taste, fine, he lays a 
plush carpet on the table, haha, well, if it makes him happy! […] Also as regards clothing, then 
I think: ‘My God, do I have to walk through town next to him?’ […] The taste difference is very 
large, but what matters to me is: how are they themselves? I mean: when you visit them, they 
welcome you in the warmest way, you’re never too much, if necessary they will always help 
you. It’s just, yes, we have a completely different taste!
Hence, both Trudy and Marsha downplay their aesthetically based judgements by 
turning to a moral repertoire of dignity and being considerate to other people (cf. Lamont, 
1992). Some upwardly mobile respondents sometimes feel stuck between (the tastes of) 
their parental milieu and their current milieu (cf. Brands, 1992; Friedman, 2012; Matthys, 
2010). Yet, ambivalence towards cultural hierarchy is by no means confined to this 
group: upwardly mobile respondents did not show more ambivalence than the well-edu-
cated respondents with well-educated parents.
Naturally, such uneasiness is experienced in actual interactions with people with 
another background, as both Marsha and Trudy described, but it can also be felt when 
these others are absent. Patrick (aged 43, team manager) recalls a conversation he had 
with his girlfriend about the question of whether or not it is acceptable to look down on 
others’ tastes:
I can say ‘Well, that’s really shit’, but I won’t say it to that person, I would say it to my 
girlfriend. […] But she thinks: ‘You cannot say that, because they like it’. [Then I said:] ‘Yes, 
but I don’t say it to them, I say it to you’. [Then she said:] ‘That isn’t nice, is it?
Apparently, Patrick has no problem with looking down on others’ bad taste, as long as he 
does not tell them openly. His girlfriend, however, wishes to keep her opinion to herself even 
when these others are not present. The reason, according to Patrick, is that she thinks twice 
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before saying something ‘that deviates from what people expect of her’. This hesitation to 
speak differently from what others expect may form a first clue – however indirect – to 
understand why many people are struggling with distinction in an interview setting, too.
Conclusion
Three empirical main conclusions stand out. First, people often contradict cultural hierar-
chical distinctions, much more often than is suggested by most studies on taste differ-
ences. They do so by defining their own and others’ cultural preferences as merely 
personal and subjective, by explicitly rejecting concepts such as ‘high culture’, or by criti-
cising people who do culturally distinguish. Indeed, a large majority of respondents in this 
study used the egalitarian repertoire in one or another version, and it was used more often 
than the contrasting hierarchical repertoire, in which one looks down on other people’s 
bad taste, or looks up to those who are seen as having a taste better than one’s own.
Second, the contradiction between the two repertoires does not only appear as disa-
greements between people, but also, and even more so, as intra-individual tensions and 
ambivalences. The majority of respondents in this study applied both repertoires. They 
switched from the one to the other in the course of the interview, or immediately down-
played their expressions of distinction by adding that they did not mean to look down on 
other people for their taste.
Third, among the majority who show ambivalence towards hierarchy, the well-edu-
cated are overrepresented. Whereas less than half of the less-educated respondents com-
bine both repertoires (the same number of them being exclusively egalitarian), 70 percent 
of the well-educated do so. Contrary to what one might expect, upwardly mobile people 
are not overrepresented within this majority.
The ambivalence shown by the well-educated can be interpreted as a conflict between 
aesthetic and moral judgements, between ranking on the basis of cultural taste and moral 
norms that prescribe equality, openness and fairness in dealing with other people. 
However, aesthetics, or culture in the narrow sense, and morality are not strictly sepa-
rated domains. Taste judgements are easily, almost inevitably, associated with judge-
ments on people’s social standing or human worth. It is for this reason that people tend 
to be inconsistent when they speak about their own and others’ cultural taste.
We propose three different lines of explanation for the internal tensions that many 
people experience when speaking about their own and others’ tastes.
Conflicting self-presentations and cultural repertoires
The first explanation refers to the ways people present themselves during an interview 
and in other social situations. As Goffman (1959) has argued, people wish to give – 
whether consciously or not – a good ‘presentation of self’ in different social situations. A 
sociological interview is one such social situation. Self-presentation in this setting par-
tially depends on the presumptions one has about the interviewer’s preferences and 
expectations (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). This article shows that this self-presentation 
can shift over the course of an interview. Koos, for example, who spoke distinctively 
about his brother’s taste, initially presented himself towards the interviewer as a cultured 
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person who is sure that his taste is better and more developed than that of less-educated 
people. When confronted with the concept ‘high culture’, later in the interview, his self-
presentation changed into that of an egalitarian person, who does not look down on oth-
ers for what they are or what they like.
The immediate downplaying of distinctive remarks can be explained in this line of 
thought, too. When people say or do something that seems to conflict with their ideal 
self, that might cause misunderstandings or that they think the interviewer might disap-
prove of, they must correct this. Therefore, they often contradict themselves and down-
play certain remarks that they made ‘too quickly’. When they use a supposedly negative 
or derogatory term, or when they think of someone they personally know, they suddenly 
realise that they do not want to be perceived as elitist or as condemning other people. 
They feel they must correct the wrong image that the interviewer might have gotten in 
order to restore the balance (cf. Hewitt and Stokes, 1975).
Problems with self-presentation in other social situations are felt as well. As several 
respondents reported, they often hide their own taste judgements towards people whose 
taste they perceive as inferior, since they do not want to hurt them by claiming 
superiority.
The role of class habitus
One may argue that this explanation in terms of self-presentations and available cultural 
repertoires is too voluntaristic and cognitivist. It views human actions as conscious and 
flexible adaptations to changing social situations and does not probe into internalised 
dispositions that motivate recurrent practices (cf. Vaisey, 2009). Here, the concept of 
habitus, or, more specifically, class habitus (Bourdieu, 1984), becomes relevant, that is, 
the internalised and embodied attitudes, tastes and behavioural routines, acquired by an 
upbringing in a certain social class or class fraction.
In their analysis of findings on ‘contradictory’ taste and lifestyle judgements among the 
Norwegian and British upper-middle classes (richer in economic and cultural capital than 
most respondents in our own study), Jarness and Friedman (2017) give class habitus a 
central explanatory role. Without exception, these respondents expressed distinction from 
lower classes. Yet, they mostly did so after having done the opposite, by using common 
egalitarian phrases such as ‘each to their own’ and ‘live and let live’. Drawing on Pugh 
(2013), the authors note that the respondents shifted in the course of the interview from 
expressing themselves as an ‘honourable’ person with egalitarian views to expressing 
‘visceral’ distinctive attitudes, which manifested emotional aversion to the tastes and life-
styles of lower classes. These shifts were often introduced by phrases such as ‘I’m not a 
snob, but … ’, compared to the downplaying remarks in our study. The same moral front 
was held up in everyday encounters with people from a lower-class background, who 
therefore tended to believe (wrongly) that members of the upper-middle class are really 
open and egalitarian. The authors conclude that ‘[f]lying under the moral radar of egali-
tarianism […] may – intentionally or otherwise – help secure the legitimacy of cultural 
distinction and class-cultural boundaries’ (Jarness and Friedman, 2017: 23).
Taking account of our own research findings, we have some reasons to put this inter-
pretation into doubt.13 While the authors state that both the distinctive ‘visceral’ and the 
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‘honourable’ self are part of the respondents’ upper-class habitus, they suggest that the 
former is much more deeply ingrained in the class habitus, whereas the latter is con-
nected with ‘the careful monitoring of self-presentation’, which serves to ‘mask’ the 
distinctive class dispositions. This is sustained by their observation that respondents first 
made egalitarian remarks, showing openness and relativism to the interviewer, and sub-
sequently – when they became more relaxed and informal – expressed their disgust for 
lower-class taste. In our study, however, the distinctive remarks often preceded the egali-
tarian ones. We did not find strong indications that the distinctive utterances reflected 
more ‘visceral’ attitudes than the egalitarian ones, let alone that the latter were merely a 
front to hide true class feelings. Distinctive speech could indeed be a spontaneous expres-
sion of emotional attitudes rooted in the class habitus, but it could also be a deliberate 
presentation of self as a cultured person, who presumes to share his or her taste prefer-
ences with the interviewer. Similarly, the downplaying of this distinction, or the anti-
hierarchical speech in response to specific questions, could be a deliberate presentation 
of self but also the expression of a habitus of egalitarianism. These are polar possibilities. 
In reality, sharp distinctions between deliberate self-presentation and habitus-induced 
spontaneous expressions are difficult to make.
The development of (tensions between) hierarchical and 
egalitarian repertoires
In line with Bourdieu’s approach, Jarness and Friedman’s interpretation is essentially 
static: egalitarianism among the dominant classes is viewed as a ‘strategy of condescen-
sion’ that serves the continuation of class inequality. By stressing the on-going reproduc-
tion of class inequalities, Bourdieu, and those who adhere to his theories, tends to neglect 
or downplay important changes in structures of inequality and habitus. However, struc-
tures of inequality, class habitus and related repertoires do change over time and should 
be explained accordingly.
The hierarchical repertoire is inherent to social stratification as such. For ages, privi-
leged groups have distinguished themselves from other groups in outward appearance 
and ways of behaving (clothing, speech, manners) to express, affirm and reproduce sta-
tus inequalities. In Europe of the 19th and early 20th centuries, class differences were 
still highly visible and enacted in interaction rituals that expressed status inequality 
through gestures of deference and dominance (Collins, 2004: 268–284). Distinction on 
the basis of cultural taste acquired particular significance from the 16th century, when 
elites began to distinguish themselves with preferences for ‘refined’ art and ‘civilised’ 
consumption (Burke, 1978; cf. Kempers, 1992).
These hierarchical distinctions were not uncontested. While members of underprivi-
leged groups tended to accept and affirm existing hierarchies through deferential behav-
iour and internalised self-definitions of inferiority, they also often felt resentment, 
resisted dominant definitions and counter-stigmatised powerful groups (Elias, 2008 
(1976); Wertheim, 1974: 105–119). Such resistance was not confined to the underprivi-
leged. The egalitarian repertoire – the moral imperative of basic equality of human 
beings – is rooted in a long Western tradition. It ranges from early Christianity, through 
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the secular ideologies of liberalism and socialism, to present-day movements opposing 
ethnic, racial and sexual discrimination.
This moral tradition did not preclude huge class and status inequalities, but in the 
course of the 20th century, and particularly after the Second World War, manifestations 
of class-related status inequality did weaken. Power and status inequalities diminished 
with political democratisation, growing economic prosperity, decreasing income and 
wealth disparities and increasing social mobility. Interaction codes came to stress infor-
mality, flexibility and equality and declared open expressions of superiority and inferior-
ity taboo (Wouters, 2007).
This did not mean that cultural distinction disappeared. The social and cultural eman-
cipation of ‘the masses’ evoked resistance among middle and upper strata. Many con-
demned the upcoming commercial popular culture (‘mass culture’) as a threat to ‘real’ 
(high) culture (Gans, 1974). In this way, the tendency of diminishing inequalities of 
power, prestige and privileges may have paradoxically contributed for some time to an 
increasing significance of cultural taste preferences as markers of status distinction (De 
Swaan, 1985: 49). With on-going processes of informalisation and status levelling during 
the past decades, however, this kind of status distinction, too, became more difficult and 
embarrassing, as this study illustrates. More recently, this uneasiness might be strength-
ened by the fear of being accused of elitism, as a populist discourse communicates. 
Transformations in the domain of cultural production itself, such as the continuous 
expansion and partial upgrading of popular culture, have also contributed to this devel-
opment. These processes have been conducive to increasing taste uncertainty, relativism 
and eclecticism.
The observed tensions between hierarchical distinction and its egalitarian rejection 
might be further explained by making a connection with a development that became 
particularly manifest since the 1980s: the spread and strengthening of a meritocratic-
individualistic ethos throughout the Western world, related to tendencies of increasing 
socio-economic inequality, flexibilisation of work relations and a further expansion of 
formal education with its stress on ‘open’ selection.14 This meritocratic ethos – widely 
accepted, particularly by the well-educated (Steijn, 2016) – comprises both the norm and 
the perception of equality of opportunity. It defines social inequalities as legitimate hier-
archies in so far as these are perceived as based on differences in individual merits, that 
is, personal capacities plus personal efforts. It combines the moral imperative of basic 
human equality, interpreted as equality of opportunity, with the acceptance of social 
inequality, interpreted as the outcome of fair competition and in this way serves to legiti-
mise existing or even growing inequalities.
In this meritocratic ideology, the significance of cultural taste differences for social 
hierarchy is not very clear. Unlike, for example, educational credentials or economic suc-
cess, ‘good taste’ in itself cannot easily be regarded as reflecting personal merit. Yet, as 
this study has shown, cultural taste is often strongly associated with educational level (or 
intelligence, as some respondents suggest), which helps to define symbolic boundaries 
between the well-educated and the less-educated. However, taste differences are also 
associated with parental upbringing, and hence with inherited class characteristics, or sta-
tus groups in the Weberian sense. As this perception does not fit the meritocratic view of 
society well, it may lead to uneasy feelings, and feed the inclination to deny or reject the 
van den Haak and Wilterdink 429
significance of cultural taste for status distinction. This may partly explain the tensions 
that people experience when speaking about their own and others’ taste preferences.
People do not behave consistently according to one logic, and social processes do not 
unfold only in one direction. As this research – like others – shows, cultural taste differ-
ences still play a significant role in perceiving and constructing hierarchical distinctions. 
At the same time, these distinctions are far from self-evident; they are often criticised, 
contradicted, denied and met with ambivalence. The disagreements, inconsistencies and 
tensions that were found in this research are not anomalies; they are normal, ordinary 
phenomena and essential for understanding the social functioning of cultural preferences 
and perceptions of class differences in the present age. Such ambivalences should there-
fore not be ignored, but rather be recognised, meticulously studied and explained by 
connecting micro and macro levels.
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Notes
 1. Jarness (2015) indeed explicitly claims to have found significant coherence at both the inter- 
and the intra-individual level.
 2. Their article was published online after we had already analysed our own data.
 3. Hence, downwardly mobile people (less-educated with well-educated parents) are not 
included, as this group is relatively rare.
 4. Please be aware that well-educated people are deliberately overrepresented in this quota 
sample.
 5. The file ‘Postcodegebieden 2004’ was used, by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
Income served as a proxy for educational level.
 6. All names are pseudonyms. Quotes were transcribed literally and then translated into English.
 7. Friedman and Kuipers (2013) and Bachmayer et al. (2014) found such relativist remarks, too, 
but mainly restricted to the less-educated. However, in their study among the upper-middle 
class, Jarness and Friedman (2017) observed such remarks frequently, too.
 8. Other researchers on cultural taste reported similar rejections of ‘claims to superiority’ 
(Warde, 2007: 16), ‘cultural paternalism’ (Bennett et al., 2009: 204) or ‘hypocrisy’ (Friedman 
and Kuipers, 2013: 190). Schwarz (2016) introduced the concept ‘farterism’, which is the lit-
eral translation of a Hebrew word that is much used in present-day Israel ‘to denounce tastes, 
cultural objects […], practices and their carriers for their alleged vain pretence’. Its meaning 
is similar to that of English expressions such as ‘fancy-schmancy, artsy-fartsy, posh, hot air 
and flatulent’ (pp.141–142).
 9. Please note that using only one of the two main repertoires during the interview does not 
mean that the same people never switch these repertoires outside the interview situation. The 
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number of 55 ‘inconsistent respondents’ can therefore be regarded as a minimum. We present 
a typology of narratives, not of people.
10. This small, neutral group will not be described in more detail here.
11. He used the Dutch word ‘volks’, which is hard to translate. It has connotations with common 
and working class (used both in a positive and derogatory way).
12. The Dutch expression ‘iemand in zijn waarde laten’ is usually translated as ‘respect someone 
as s/he is’, but that would omit the moral connotation of the word ‘waarde’ (literally: worth).
13. The differences in research findings between the two studies may be partly attributed to dif-
ferences in respondents’ social characteristics: the respondents in our study represent a much 
wider variety of class positions, and only a few of them have an upper-middle-class position 
similar to that of the respondents in Jarness and Friedman’s study.
14. Meritocratic individualism is an old and strong tradition in the United States, where it is com-
monly known as the ‘American dream’ (Lewis, 1978; Mennell, 2007: 249–265). During the 
past few decades, it spread and became stronger in other Western societies as well, according 
to several indications (Mijs, 2017; Steijn, 2016; cf. Wilterdink, 2016). Its spread is para-
doxically connected with tendencies of increasing economic inequality resulting from mar-
ketisation processes, which contribute to a growing gap between the meritocratic norm and 
perception of equality of opportunity on one hand, and the reality of decreasing mobility 
chances on the other (cf. Mijs, 2016).
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